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G.: Negligence--Liability of Charitable Hospital--Insurance
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
agreements with employers, but that the union is the principal
for the benefit of its members, as illustrated by the instant case.
Thus, a contract made by a labor union with an employer may be
enforced by an employee even though he is not mentioned by name
in the contract.
The West Virginia court, in Gleason v. Thomas, 117 W. Va.
550, 186 S.E. 304 (1986), permitted the employees to enforce the
contract between the employer and the union, but failed to indicate
the theory under which the parties were bound.
In Yazoo 8c Miss. Valley R.R. v. Webb, 64 F.2d 902 (5th Cir.
1933), the court allowed a non-union employee to recover on the
union-employer contract under the third-party beneficiary theory.
The Mississippi court permitted recovery under this theory in
Gulf & S.LR.R. v. McGlohn, 183 Miss. 465, 184 So. 71 (1938).
Accord, Schlenk v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 74 F. Supp. 569 (D.C.N.J.
1947).
A distinction between the agency theory and the third-partybeneficiary theory is that, under the former, the union has little
retained by way of direct enforcement, with whatever rights of
enforcement the contract provides given the employees on whose
behalf the contract was entered into; while under the third-party
theory, both the union and the individual employees are able to
enforce the contract.
Thus, the courts of many states, including West Virginia,
have not been consistent with their reasoning in regard to the
right of the employee to sue on the union-employer contract.
The third-party beneficiary theory seems the most satisfactory
and just method in dealing with this problem, and the West Virginia court seems to have applied this theory in the principal case.
J. L. A.

NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF CHARITABLE HOSPITAL-INSURANCE.--

P brought an action against D, a charitable hospital, for injuries
sustained as a result of the negligence of its employee, alleging that
D carried liability insurance out of which a judgment could be
satisfied. D demurred on the basis that coverage by insurance did
not create liability in instances where the policyholder was immune
from liability because of its charitable character. Held, on certification, that D was not liable; that the immunity still existed even
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though D was insured against such liability. Fisher v. Ohio Valley
General Hospital Ass'n, 73 S.E.2d 667 (W. Va. 1952).
The weight of authority supports the rule that a beneficiary of
a charitable association cannot hold the association liable for negligent injuries. Hospital of St. Vincent v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101,
81 S.E. 13 (1914); 109 A.L.R. 1202 (1937). The reasons for the
rule differ widely in the adjudicated cases. Some courts say that
one accepting the benefits of such a charity exempts his benefactor
from liability for the negligent acts of its servants; others that
nonliability is based on the ground that trust funds created for
benevolent purposes should not be diverted to purposes never
intended by the donor. Exemption is frequently sanctioned upon
the basis of the inapplicability of respondeat superior, in that
hospital employees and attendants are not servants of the hospital
but of the patient because of the nature and manner of their
services to the patient. Immunity is also ofttimes predicated upon
the ground of public policy, holding that the common welfare
requires that charities should be encouraged, and the trust funds
protected from dissipation.
Our court in Roberts v. Ohio Valley General Hospital, 98 W.
Va. 476, 127 S.E. 318 (1925), decided that a charitable hospital is
liable to a beneficiary for negligent injuries sustained only in
instances where it has been negligent in the selection and retention
of employees, taking a position of conditional or qualified liability.
The court refused to alter the rule in the instant case, even
though a new question, that of liability insurance coverage by the
charitable association, was presented. Some courts, as our court
admitted, which hold charitable hospitals immune under other
circumstances, withdraw the immunity where such insurance is
tarried. Morton v. Savannah Hospital, 148 Ga. 438, 96 S.E. 887
(1918); O'Conner v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n, 105 Colo.
259, 96 P.2d 835 (1939). In the opinion, the Illinois court was
pointed out as a court which recognized the complete immunity
of such institutions where insurance was not carried, and Simon
v. Pelouze, 263 Ill. App. 177 (1931), was cited as authority. Then
the court further pointed out that in Wendt v. Servite Fathers, 832
Ill. App. 618, 76 N.E.2d 342 (1947), the Illinois court withdrew
the immunity when insurance was carried, taking the view that the
charitable institution waived the immunity since a fund, other
than the trust fund, was provided to satisfy the imposed liability.
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While our court did not go into the matter, the fallacy in this line
of reasoning lies in the fact that premiums paid for the insurance
deplete the trust fund and may do so to a greater extent than if the
institution were held liable for the negligence of its servants and
agents in the first place.
In refusing to hold that carrying of insurance made any difference, our court stated, ". . . to make an exception in the case of
one institution which has such insurance and deny in others that do
not, would constitute the beginning of a descent into a quagmire
of judicial confusion ... "
This is in line with its holding that the carrying of liability
insurance on school buses does not waive immunity of the board
of education from liability. In Boice v. Board of Education, 111
W. Va. 95, 160 S.E. 566 (1931), where the board had secured
insurance, it was held that it could not waive its governmental immunity. It might be said that charitable hospitals could not waive
an immunity given them by the law, since such immunity is given
them on the basis of public policy. See Roberts v. Ohio Valley
General Hospital, supra.
In West Virginia it could be ably argued that there was no
intent to waive immunity on the part of the institutions when
insurance was purchased since they are conditionally liable undel
the doctrine laid down in the Roberts case, and therefore the)
might well purchase the insurance as being necessary to cover that
liability and possibly at a premium rate less than if they were
completely liable. Therefore it seems that the court was right
in deciding that the purchase of liability insurance creatd no right
of action where none had existed.
Cases supporting the West Virginia position are substantial in
number. Williams v. Church Home, 223 Ky. 355, 3 S.W.2d 753
(1928) ; Greatrex v. Evangelical Deaconess Hospital, 261 Mich. 327,
246 N.W. 137 (1933); Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Moore, 156
Miss. 676, 126 So. 465 (1930); Schau v. Morgan, 241 Wis. 334, 6 N.W.:
2d 212 (1942) ; DeGroot v. Edison Institute, 306 Mich,. 339, 10 N.W.
2d 907 (1943).
[Since the writing of this comment the court has reaffirmed its
position in Meade v. St. Francis Hospital of Charleston, 74 S.E.2d
405 (W. Va. 1953).]
B. A. G.
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